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Abstract
Accounts of organizational change are trapped in a narrative perception of a linear coherence of beginning, middle and end. We propose instead that organizational change should be represented as story. Story implies that changes are fundamentally polyphonic, equivocal, dialogical, unfinished and unresolved. Story is antenarrative. Story suspends beginnings, middles and ends and gives voice to a plurality of voices inherent in organizational changes. We propose Foucault’s power analysis, genealogy, as a method for tracing stories. We demonstrate the ideas of genealogy by relating it to Ricoeur’s work on narrative and time where experience is portrayed as a mimetic circle where endpoints lead back to pre-narration. We argue instead that organizational changes are the results of complex chains of interactions, negotiations and struggles. Narrative is therefore illusive. Genealogical scrutiny thus shakes up the mimetic circle and opens up for new interpretations of organizational phenomena by revealing the power relations embedded in the conditions in which change in organizations are storied and re-storied.
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ANTENARRATIVE INQUIRY: GENEALOGY AND STORY ANALYSIS IN ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction
The relationship between story and narrative is a crucial problem in research of organizational change. Boje addresses this problem by using the concept antenarrative. Antenarrative denotes “…the fragmented, non-linear, incoherent, collective, unplotted and pre-narrative speculation, a bet” (Boje 2001, p. 1). For Boje antenarrative analysis is a solution to the crisis in modern narrative methods. Antenarrative analysis is the analysis of stories “…that are too unconstructed and fragmented to be analyzed in traditional approaches” (Boje 2001, p. 1). Story is before – “ante” - narrative. To emphasize story instead of narrative means to uphold the unfinished and open character of interpretations and experiences. It is thus a condition for reflexive practice where we engage in the “…act of questioning the basis of our thinking, surfacing the taken-for-granted rules underlying organizational decisions, and examining critically our own practices and ways of relating with others” (Cunliffe and Jun 2005, p. 227). 

Antenarrative analysis of organizational change means to resist taken-for-grantedness and to praise the unfinished and the unresolved because this is the condition for learning something new about organizational change. Antenarrative is the attempt to free stories from the linear sequence of beginning, middle and end in narrative (see next section). Organizational changes are instead polyphonic. Internal tensions, contradictory forces and paradox are inherent in change because it has many different threads and comes from many different places. In this paper, we propose taking a story approach to organizational change, which implies what we call antenarrative inquiry. Secondly, Foucault’s power analysis, which draws heavily on Nietzschean genealogy, is proposed as one way of undertaking antenarrative inquiry. The paper is organized in three steps. First, we discuss the relations between story, narrative and genealogical analysis. Secondly, we describe the principles of Ricouer’s work Narrative and Time, which stands as one of the most important contributions to narrative analysis in general. We then relate this work to the discussion on story and narrative. Thirdly, we describe the principles of genealogical analysis and relate it to research of organizational change.

Story, narrative and genealogical analysis
Antenarrative is a reaction towards a critical problem in narrative analysis of organizational change; namely that it is imprisoned in what Boje and Durant refer to as a modern obsession with the coherence of beginning, middle and end (BME-narratives) (Boje and Durant 2006). Narrative is thus a whole telling with a linear sequence of beginning, middle and end, and organized around a single plot that changes little over time (Boje 2008). Such narratives are what Gabriel refers to as proper stories as opposed to proto-stories (Gabriel 2000, p. 20).  Narrative thus contains a moral and “agreed” interpretation on something that is in reality fragmented, pluralistic, paradoxical and ambiguous. Narratives are moral imprisonment that seeks to control our interpretations, our actions and our potentials (Boje and Durant 2006, p. 19). Their logical coherence of beginning, middle and end are imposed on stories.

As such the idea of narrative temporality (e.g. Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004) is illusive. We are looking for something a lot more complex and which we might refer to as polyphonic temporality. In other words, the problem of narrative is that it has a tendency to monopolize truth, while reality, in reality, is plural (Arendt 1998). Narrative has an important function in providing a stable center, which according to Spivak reflects humankind’s common desire for assurance of mastery (Spivak 1997, p. xi). Narratives are thus the results of what Bakhtin calls the centripetal forces of language; forces that seek to overcome what he calls heteroglossia – that is the condition that the word uttered in that place and that time will have a different meaning than under other conditions (Bakhtin 1981, p. 263 and p. 428). 

Heteroglossia always contains a multiplicity of voices that ensures the dynamics and development of language: “Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces or language carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-idealogical centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 271). Narrative order and story disorder are thus countervailing forces of organization that always exist side by side in organizations, and which ensures the organization’s continuous development. 

The critique of narrative in relation to organizational change is thus two-fold. By ordering processes of organizational change in a linear sequence of BME and by means of a retrospective gaze (Boje 2007), narrative displaces and overlooks discontinuity, fragmentation and ambiguity. Thus it forgets and overlooks the differences, the other voices and complex interactions inherent in creating organizational change. Secondly, narrative becomes a tyranny of truth. Narrative demands an I capable of organizing a narrative sequence and telling the truth (Derrida 2004, p. 81) – to tell us exactly what happened (Derrida 2004, p. 72). But by the same token, narrative becomes a violent instrument of torture (Derrida 2004, p. 78) in excluding and suppressing other voices and other truths.

The problem is however that BME narratives are powerful in the sense that the perception of linear sequence of BME is imposed on us from everywhere as the correct way of speaking and acting. Organizational researchers are also narrators in the sense that we are required to inform our audiences about what happened in a relatively well-structured, unambiguous and rational way. As such we follow Benjamin and argue that the storytellers among us are rare and have become more and more distant with the progress of modernity (Benjamin 1999, p. 83). We are required to tell the truth about organizational change but in this way we often impose an simplified explanation and contribute to what Benjamin would refer to as the destructive forces of history (Nutting 1997). We are not independent of history but are parts of history. Therefore our telling is constructed by relations of power embedded in everyday life. (Hardy and Clegg 1996; Ainsworth and Hardy 2004; Jørgensen 2007). As such it is difficult to escape mainstream narratives that emphasize universal truth, rationality, modernity and Christianity. 

Antenarrative is an attempt to shake narrative by emphasizing that language is fundamentally openended, unfinished, unresolved, ambiguous dialogical and plural. Antenarrative is before narrative but this “before” should be considered a permanent condition where the narrator is displaced in favor of emphasizing the historical conditions and circumstances in which stories develop(ed), evolve(d) and change(d). Story has no borderlines: “It is at once larger and smaller than inself, it is entangled in a play with other “stories”, is part of the other, makes the other a part of itself etc. and remains utterly different from its homonym, narrative (Derrida 2004, p. 82). Stories occur in the moment and go in unpredictable directions. They float in a soup of bits and pieces. They are never alone but live and breathe in web of other stories (Boje 2001, p. 18). 

The intention, however, is not to execute the narrator. The intention is to increase her awareness of self by making her conscious of how she is affected by organizations, societies and cultures; that is to make her stronger and independent by making her more reflexive of self and her relationship with other people. To increase this awareness of self, we need, among others, what Nietzsche refers to as critical history employed in the service of life. Nietzsche argues that if man is to live he must possess the ability from time to time to break up and dissolve a part of the past. “…he does this by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it” (Nietzsche 1997, pp. 75-76). For that purpose, Nietzsche developed and employed genealogy to question the grand narratives of his contemporaries; in particular Christianity and Enlightenment modernity (Nietzsche 1992; Nietzsche 1997). 

By writing a genealogy of morality for example, Nietzsche wants to show us that morality has a history and thus that morality is an invention of a particular human type (Ansell Pearson in Nietzsche 1994, p. x). He argues that to do so we need a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which that particular morality grew, evolved and changed; “morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding, but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison” (Nietzsche 1992, p. 456). To gain an awareness of self is for Nietzsche to gain what he calls a historical spirit – an awareness of who you are and where you come from in order to master yourself on a higher level (Nietzsche 1992, First essay, section 2). This includes the darker sides of our history because without acquiring a bad conscience we cannot envisage higher norms and new states of being, and we cannot attain self-mastery (Kaufmann 1992, p. 448). 

Nietzsche’s genealogy is later taken up by Foucault in his analytics of power (Foucault 1978; Foucault 1984). More specifically, it is employed in writing the history of the present (Foucault 1979, p. 31). It is an analytics of power used with a particular purpose – to make us more reflexive of the present by creating an alternative memory (Jørgensen 2007, p. 15). It is first of all a reflexive endeavour directed against our taken for grantedways of thinking, acting and speaking. Genealogy follows the principles of antenarrative. It seeks to go beyond narrative imprisonment by trying to reconstruct the conditions under which stories grew, evolved and changed. Genealogy records the history of interpretations. This means that present day narratives are not more true or just than others. They have a history where time has been interpreted and reinterpreted again and again according to the particular historical conditions and circumstances.
 
As such, interpretation is not the search for the single coherent plot in texts, talk and actions because interpretation already lies underneath them: when there is no single coherent plot to interpret “…then everything is open for interpretation” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 107). This groundlessness is at the heart of antenarrative. It means that we must leave behind and get away from this idea of narrative coherence. We are instead searching for what came before the plot and in what conditions and circumstances the plot was configured. Doing so one shakes the narrative process and opens up the world for other interpretations and other voices. I view genealogy as one way of performing antenarrative analysis in that it tries to reconstruct and follow the stories before they become trapped in narrative coherence.

Experience of time as threefold mimesis
Ricoeur’s work on time and narrative (Ricoeur 1984; Ricoeur 1985; Ricoeur 1988) is the starting point for discussing story and antenarrative in relation to organizational change. Ricoeur’s theory of time and narrative is a theory of the construction of experience, which for him is captured in the notion of human time. By distinguishing between time and human time, he maintains that time exists beyond subjective experience and he seeks to overcome the object – subject divide present in the literature on time (Kemp 1999; Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, p. 269). Time does not only exist as an existential subjective act as claimed by Augustin, Husserl and Heidegger (Ricoeur 1988; Kemp 1999); time exists as facts with a before and an after. Ricoeur suggests that narrative can reconcile objective and subjective conceptualizations of time by combining Augustin’s theory of time as threefold present with Aristotle’s writings on plot to develop a theory of time as threefold mimesis (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, pp. 269-270). 

This means also that there are forces in time that interact with human experience. Arendt argues that action and speech are always concerned with the matters of the world “…out of which arise their specific, objective worldly interests” (Arendt 1998, p. 182). She distinguishes between a physical worldly in-between which consists of the worlds of things and the worlds of physics. However she also identify another in-between, which consists of deeds and words and owes its origin to men’s acting and speaking. This subjective in-between is not tangible but despite of this, this in-between is no less real. She calls this reality the web of human relationships (Arendt 1998, pp. 182-183). We might refer to the first in-between as objective time and the second in-between as objectified time. As such the relationships between objective time, objectified time and human time may be more or less intimate – but this does not mean that these forces can be reduced to the same. 

Objective and objectified time exist as a fact and condition for human existence and it is expressed in words, concepts, artifacts, rituals, symbols etc. (Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 2004, pp. 19-20). As such there is a distinction between world (time) and reality (human time). The world is what it is. Reality is our sense of, our knowledge of and our feelings for this world (Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 2004, p. 17). Reality is what works for us. The relationship between time and human time is mediated by language where the use of language is governed by tacit rules such as norms, traditions, conventions etc. (Wittgenstein 1983; Shotter 2005; Jørgensen 2007).

Human time is the experience of time. Ricoeur claims that between the activity of narrating a story and the temporal character of human experience, there is a correlation which is not incidental but must be perceived as a transcultural necessity. Ricoeur’s hypothesis is that “…time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of human existence” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 52). Ricoeur explores the relations between time and narrative through what he calls three moments of mimesis. He refers to these three moments as mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3. What brings these moments together is the power of configuration. He suggests that the meaning comprised by the power of configuration is the result of the intermediary position between two operations which Ricoeur calls mimesis1 and mimesis3 and which constitutes the two sides of mimesis2. 

This procedure is contrary to the scientific procedure, which Ricoeur calls the semiotics of a text (Ricoeur 1984, p. 53). Instead, Ricoeur’s approach is inspired by hermeneutics and the hermeneutical task is to reconstruct the set of operations, whereby a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of life, action and suffering and to be given by an author to readers who through their reception of the work change their ways of acting. Semiotic theory is, according to Ricoeur, only interested in the literary text. Hermeneutics, however, is concerned with the interplay between history, text, authors and readers (Ricoeur 1984, p. 53). He suggests that what is at stake is the process by which the textual configuration mediates through the prefiguration of the practical field and its refiguration in the reception of the work. It is the reader who is the operator and by means of acting – the action of reading – creates the unity that criss-crosses from mimesis1 to mimesis3 through mimesis2 (Ricoeur 1984, p. 53). The relations between mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3 constitute in this way “…the dynamics of emplotment”, that is how plot is shaped. It is this dynamic, which according to Ricoeur is the central element in the description of the relations between time and narrative. 

Ricoeur, in other words, claims to solve the problem of the relations between time and narrative by showing the mediating role that emplotment has between the moment of practical experience, which goes before emplotment, and the moment of refiguration that follows it. We are following, therefore, the destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a configured time” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 54). Human time, the experience of things, is historical: there is a before (mimesis1) and an after (mimesis3) with intimate relations between them. Emplotment emerges on the background of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the power of configuration. Narratives are created within a “circle of mimesis” (Ricoeur 1984, pp. 71-76) where postunderstandings lead back to starting points and within that dynamics incorporate pre-understandings of what he calls semantic structures, symbolic resources and temporal characteristics” (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, pp. 270-271). 

Story and narrative
We can use the model of three-fold mimesis to discuss the relationship between story and narrative. We will begin with the stage called mimesis2 in Ricoeur’s circle of mimesis, emplotment. Plot mediates in three different ways. First, it mediates between individual events and the story as a whole: “…It draws a meaningful story from a diversity of events or incidents (Aristotle’s pragmata) that it transforms the events or incidents into a story … In short, emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of a single succession” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 65). Secondly, the plot draws together heterogeneous factors such as “ … agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected results” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 65; Chappell, Rhodes et al. 2003, p. 45). Finally plot mediates in a third way: “ … that of its temporal characteristics. These allow us to call plot, by means of generalization, a synthesis of the heterogeneous” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 66). 

Emplotment combines in different ways two temporal dimensions: one chronological and one that is not: “The former constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the story insofar as it is made up of events. The second is the configurational dimension properly speaking, through which the plot transforms events into a story” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 66). Plot provides an end point of the story, which organizes the individual events and which makes it possible to follow a story. This end point of the story, its conclusion, must be acceptable as congruent with the events brought together in narrative (Ricoeur 1984, pp. 66-67). The final stage of the mimetic circle is called mimesis3. With reference to Gadamer (1992), this stage corresponds to “application” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 70). 

Mimesis3 is where “the world of the text” intersects with the hearer/reader. It is where narrative experience is manifested in words and actions and becomes the object of “public” attention and where it undergoes inter-subjective negotiation and so forth. As such human existence is represented as a continuous process directed towards the future with life as a continuous process of narration. What we at every moment may call the plot involves an interpretive organizing of life where the plot is continuously re-storied or/and reorganized throughout the duration of life. Ricoeur follows Gallie’s argument here and argues that the explanations a narrative contains are “…not born from something but “proceeds” in some way or another from some discourse that already has a narrative form” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 149). 

Ricoeur’s mimetic circle appears more complex than BME-narratives, yet it reproduces the basic problem of narrative analysis. To narrate a story in Ricoeur’s circle of mimesis is to reduce heterogeneous factors into a single order. In other words it has a tendency to linearize reality into a BME-structure. It is not necessarily a perfect order in the sense of not allowing internal tensions, paradoxes, inconsistencies, sudden reversals, horror and pity (Ricoeur 1984, p. 73). These internal tensions and inconsistencies derive from the fact that narrative has a history; it proceeds from something. Still, Ricoeur’s model is not antenarrative analysis or story analysis. It is a model of narrative temporality (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004), where the analysis is a result of what Bakhtin calls the centripetal forces of language as noted earlier. 

Ricoeur’s mimetic circle thus invites us to tell a proper story (e.g. Gabriel 2000) but it doesn’t invite for the analysis of stories, which implies that antenarrative, not narrative, is seen as the permanent condition. This implies also that reality is seen as a permanent state of becoming, rather than being, where the latter would be the focus of narrative analysis. Narrative analysis would have a tendency to allow specific actors to monopolize truth. This is for example the case in qualitative interviews where actors are asked to give their accounts of specific organizational change processes. The result is a retrospective, linear, and relatively rational account of organizational change. 

Czarniawska gives a good example of this in arguing that when researchers ask people to compare their situation with that of two years ago, they ask them to compare, abstract and generalize. The answer often started like this “you need some background information first”. As she argues, this is the point in narrative analysis (Czarniawska 1997, p. 28). In our view this is a good example of allowing actors to monopolize and linearize reality. Even if a number of actors in different positions are interviewed, it still doesn’t solve the problem because we don’t  have access to the interactions between the actors and their physical and subjective worldly in-betweens. In other words, we don’t see the actor as acting and speaking in-between, and most action and speech is concerned with this in-between (Arendt 1998, p. 182).

The analysis of stories takes its starting point in this in-between and is thus more interested in the web of human relationships with its conflicting wills and intentions, which produce actions and speech (Arendt 1998, p. 184). In comparison with narrative, story implies the analysis of actions and speech in a plural or polyphonic world. Speech and action take place in and through a multiplicity of force relations (Foucault 1993, pp. 333-334) in which no one is an author or producer of their life stories but instead are seen as shaped by language (Michelfelder and Palmer 1989, p. 2; Arendt 1998, p. 184) from which they become co-authors and co-producers of history through inter-subjective participation and negotiation. Plot is in other words the result of a collective act of storytelling. It is “…a joint performance of tellers and hearers in which often overlooked, very subtle utterances play an important role in the negotiation of meaning and co-production in a story-telling episode” (Boje 1991, p. 107).

Since stories derive from language, stories also share the same characteristics as language; namely that language is fundamentally ambiguous, open-ended, negotiated, unfinished and unresolved. Language is a game or play with words, concepts and meanings (Wittgenstein 1983). Construction of reality is as such a dynamic and spontaneous process, which occurs in the moment: “…focus of our inquiries will become the spontaneously expressed, living, responsive, relational activities occurring out in the world between us for all to see” (Shotter 2005, p. 114). As such the principle of story analysis is antenarrative, which for us emphasizes the openness, unfinishedness and unresolvedness of the stories we tell and further implies the polyphonic character of the material from which we create our stories. 

This material is represented as mimesis1 in Ricoeur’s mimetic circle as pre-narrative structures. In his framework mimesis1 is a precondition for emplotment and it consists of three aspects of pre-understanding: its meaningful structures, symbolic resources and its temporal character (Ricoeur 1984, p. 54).  The meaningful structures comprise what Ricoeur refers to as our competencies for utilizing the conceptual network (1984, pp. 54-55). It involves a familiarity and understanding of concepts such as goals, motives, agents, means, cooperation, competition, struggle, success, failure etc. (Ricoeur 1984, p. 55). It also involves the competencies in putting these sentences and concepts in composition - to put them together to something meaningful (see also Kemp 1999, p. 37). Another pre-narrative structure is the symbolic resources (signs, rules, norms etc.) which are the condition that human action can be narrated at all (Ricoeur 1984, pp. 57-58). 

The final pre-narrative structure is the temporal characteristics of language. Here, Ricoeur draws on Heidegger’s concept within-time-ness (being-within-time), which is described in Heidegger’s principal work Being and Time (Heidegger 1962). Within time-ness is defined as a simple characteristic of Care (Sorge); that we are thrown among things and must care about them. Expressions like have the time to, take the time to, to lose are very revealing according to Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1984, p. 62). Similar comments can be made about adverbs like: then, after, later, earlier, since, so long as, during, all the while that, not that, etc. All these expressions, according to Ricoeur, are oriented towards the datable and public character of the time of preoccupation, where preoccupation determines the meaning of this meaning of this time: “…a day is not an abstract measure; it is a length that corresponds to our Care and the world in which it is “time to” do something, where “now” signifies “now that …” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 63). Time is “time to do something” and therefore our preoccupation determines the meaning of time. 

From a story point of view these meaningful structures, symbolic resources and temporal characteristics are all integrated into the language games which govern the web of human relationships. As such they have been shaped in a complex interplay between actors, intentions and interests. They are themselves the results of action and thus plurality (Arendt 1998, p. 184). Further, the pre-narrative structures that go before the narrative (plot) are to static. Rather these meaningful structures, symbolic resources and temporal characteristics of language are integrated into the moment where actors use them to story, re-story and thus reinterpret, modify and change the course of history. As such the analysis of stories implies an emphasis on diegesis instead of mimesis, because storying takes place “…in practical circumstances (contexts and spaces) and in particular moments (time) in which meaning may vary” (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, p. 273).

Genealogy
The concept of story implies the suspension of beginning, middles and ends in order to order that we might gain a more reflexive relationship with the world. To perform such antenarrative inquiry, we propose drawing on genealogical analysis (Flyvbjerg 2001; Jørgensen 2002; Jørgensen 2007). This means that emphasis is shifted in Ricoeur’s model from the narrator to the conditions and circumstances in which stories grew, evolved and changed; that is, emphasis is shifted from seeing changes as subjectively constructed to seeing them as inter-subjectively constructed. 

Ricoeur has a tendency to emphasize the narrators of organizational change, where a postmodern or poststructural position emphasizes the context and spaces where change is storied, and re-storied (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, p. 272)  – a viewpoint that makes the change process more dynamic, liquid, polyphonic and paradoxical. These circumstances comprise other actors/actants (Latour 1996) with whom/what we engage. That means that an important aspect of any narrative becomes visible – namely the relations of power and how they influence the narrative (Hardy and Clegg 1996; Hardy and Phillips 2004; Clegg, Courpasson et al. 2006; Jørgensen 2007). By emphasizing performance (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, p. 272), narrating becomes more situated and relational and thus influenced by other actors in more or less powerful positions and with diverging interests and intentions. 

Genealogy was Nietzsche’s way of writing critical history that was acting counter to our time, thereby acting on our time and hopefully for the time to come (Nietzsche 1997, p. 60; Elden 2001, pp. 111-112). It later became an indispensable part of Foucault’a studies of the relations between power and knowledge (Gordon 1980) where it was employed in writing the history of the present, which means taking an interest in the past in order to write the history of the present (Foucault 1979, p. 31). This demands that we see our thoughts, ideas, concepts, actions, norms and standards as descended from history. As such we have to follow the stories in order to understand the present, including the narratives which are an indispensable part of identity (Chappell, Rhodes et al. 2003; Sfard and Prusak 2005). 

By writing a history of the present, Foucault wishes to go beyond the narratives of the present in order to open them up for questioning. He calls these uses of history, the parodic, dissociative and sacrificial uses of history (Foucault 1984, pp. 91-95; Bauer 1999, p. 62; Jørgensen 2007, pp. 71-74). They are characterized by the attempt to tear of the “masks” (narratives) of the present in order to write an alternative memory of what happened. The parodic use is directed against reality in opposing “…the theme of history as reminiscence or recognition” (Bauer 1999, p. 61). The dissociative use is directed against identity in opposing history as continuity or representative of tradition. Finally, the sacrificial use is directed against truth in opposing the traditional “objective” historian (Bauer 1999, p. 61). Power is as noted as an indispensable part of this development and the question of power is one reason why Nietzsche criticizes traditional historians of morality because the “… historical spirit itself is lacking in them …” (Nietzsche 1992, p. 12). 

According to Nietzsche everything said and done needs to be judged according to questions of who, where and when - that is, there is no independently objective and de-contextualised truth or justice. It is “the good themselves who have judged themselves and their actions as good (Nietzsche 1994, p. 12). Therefore, Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that Foucault’s genealogy is interpretive analytics (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). Interpretive analytics involves this kind of historical spirit where everything said and done is judged and evaluated according to the context in which it is said and done. It seeks to make people conscious of who they are, where they come from and why things are the way they are.

Through the use of history, Foucault wishes to bring subjected knowledges into play in order to show that things need not be so. History is his critique (Haugaard, 1997, p. 44). More specifically genealogy is “…an insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (Foucault 1980, p. 81). Two kinds of knowledge are resurrected. The first is historical contents that have been buried and disguised in coherence or formal systemisation (Foucault 1980, pp. 81-82). That is, BME narratives of the present impose an abstract and unitary order on material that is otherwise fragmented and distorted. This means that instead of looking at organizational change with the unifying order of the BME narrative, we should look at organizational change as a collection of dispersed events with their own history and identity and existing in their own specific context. It is through the revival of such local knowledge – local stories – that Foucault wishes to give us a more appropriate picture of the conditions of organizational change and thus wants to allow us to follow the stories before they become trapped in narrative. 

The second is about reviving directly disqualified knowledges (Foucault 1980, p. 82) – stories that are deemed illegitimate and barred or excluded from analysis. These are the marginalized voices: the losers in the storytelling game – the stories that lost the battle and thereafter almost completely disappeared from the scene. These are the darker sides of history - those events that people might like to forget because they are embarrassing, shameful or just do not fit with their constructed images of themselves. People are not necessarily polite, civilized, noble, pragmatic or reasonable. Genealogy is open for the worst cases to occur (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 95). People can be evil, immoral, obnoxious, selfish and capable of doing whatever it takes to promote their own intentions or interests. Genealogy reveals that the concept of liberty is an invention of the ruling classes and not necessarily the basic condition of man (Foucault 1979, pp. 78-79). It reveals that rationality was born in an altogether reasonable fashion - from chance (Foucault 1984, p. 78; Bauer 1999, p. 61). 

As such, genealogy doesn’t see history as logical or directed to improvement and Enlightenment. On the contrary, because “…historical beginnings are lowly: not in the sense of modest or discreet steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation” (Foucault 1984, p. 79). Power should also be understood in this equally less glorious and more mundane manner. It does not derive from the king. The constitution of social life is instead derived from “…a complex set of petty and ignoble power relations” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 43). Power is the consequence of local strategies and is the overall effect of petty confrontations between actors fighting over what is true and what is just (see Haugaard, 1997, pp. 68-69).

As such genealogy seeks to show how these “storytelling games” developed, where they came from, how they evolved and changed, who were involved and in what circumstances these kinds of story-ing were produced. Genealogy recognizes that actors have descended from many different places (Foucault 1984, pp. 81-83; see also Jørgensen 2007, pp. 66-67, and Bauer 1999, pp.60-61 on the notion of descent (Herkunft)). Actors have a history and this history influences, limits and makes possible certain ways of story-ing realities. But descent does not stem from one place; it stems from many different places which implies that the self has numberless beginnings and is fragmented, differentiated and shaped by accidents. 

“… to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals - the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us: it is to discover that truth and being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents” (Foucault, 1984, p. 81).

As such the narrator has been displaced by historical conditions and circumstances. She is nothing but part of history and the results of accidents. 

Furthermore, genealogy seeks to show how phenomena have emerged (Foucault 1984; see also Jørgensen 2007, pp. 67-68, on the notion of emergence) as a consequence of complex “storytelling games” involving many different actors in different positions and with different intentions. In the same way as descent is not to be considered as an undisturbed continuity, neither is emergence the final stage of historical development. Emergence is linked with force and the purpose of an analysis of emergence is to delineate the interaction between different forces:

“Emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of the Entstehung must delineate this interaction. The struggle these forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances, and the attempt to avoid degeneration and regain strength by dividing these forces against themselves” (Foucault, 1984, pp. 83-84).

“Force” and “struggle” are central to the analysis of emergence. It is a scene on which different forces meet face-to-face (Foucault, 1984, p. 84). While descent describes the character of the instinct and its inscription in the body, emergence is “…a place of confrontation” (Foucault, 1984, p. 84). Emergence is the result of a relation between forces. As a consequence, no one is responsible for emergence; “…no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice” (Foucault, 1984, p. 85). As such the actions of people have to be viewed in interaction with particular material circumstances and other actors. This means that emergence is never finished or complete. It moves through new relations and new confrontations, which carry with them new objects and new ways of speaking and where it becomes fixed in rituals, in procedures, in norms and rules, in concepts and words, in systems and technologies, in stories, in ways of story-ing and in narratives. 

Genealogy and organizational change
Genealogy has implications in terms of understanding and inquiring into organizational change. Neither Foucault nor Nietzsche takes for granted the identity of phenomena. Instead they search for the non-identical by exploring dissensions, disparities and differences (Bauer 1999, p. 63). In other words, genealogy search for stories rather than narratives and thus displace what Bauer calls “…universalized accounts of history and create counternarratives that reject and subvert the ideological presuppositions of enlightenment” (Bauer 1999, p. 63). In order to do that, Nietzsche and Foucault uses history as noted before.

In practical terms, this requires a great collection of source material which might illuminate what takes place in different contexts and spaces and in different points in time: “Genealogy is gray, meticulous and patiently documentary” (Foucault 1984, p. 76). In other words we need source material which may provide rich accounts of the complex course of history which leads to the emergence of new organizational phenomena. These are accounts that ideally should make it possible to follow the stories as they progress, develop and change through interactions and negotiations among actors in different positions and with different intentions. 
 
These storytelling episodes that result in the emergence of new organizational phenomena thus become more like a game that changes with every move. Game or language game is a brilliant metaphor here as it incorporates the notion of moves, countermoves, tactics and positioning (Jørgensen 2007, p. 38). Like language games, stories are always under constant change which changes the conditions for the next move (see also Gergen, Gergen et al. 2004, pp. 42-44). The game (or games) takes place on many different scenes or sets. 

This is similar to Tamara, Los Angeles’ longest running play (described in Boje 2001). This play takes place on many different scenes and sets. It has actors, who come and go, the audience is rolled in and out and follows the stage acts in different scenes. It is a story - which never ends. The stories are never finished and always appear to be looking for their plots. Stories are not predictable; and the history of organizations are apt to be full of surprises, coincidences, inconsistencies, circumstance and chance – because people are wonderfully intelligent, wise, imaginative, cheerful, joyful and lustful but they are also sometimes irrational, incompetent, envious and greedy for power. 

In practical terms, story implies that we need knowledge about interactions and negotiations among actors. We don’t want to argue for avoiding interviews with actors because individual actors are invaluable sources of memory in most cases, and it would be extremely difficult to interpret interactions without asking the actors who take part in these interactions. But these accounts need to be supplemented with other forms of source material and they need to be organized so that they provide knowledge of interactions in contexts, spaces and time. We don’t want the actors to interpret their life story, to abstract or to generalize. We want them to give factual accounts on factual questions. Who participated, what happened, where and when did it happen and what were the circumstances (see also Jørgensen 2007, pp. 59-60, 90) Even if these accounts of course are interpretive, it is interpretation of a less totalizing kind.

Furthermore we need to supplement it with other sources; for example in what Foucault would call the archive: that is the collection of historical material (Jørgensen 2007, p. 56). This includes minutes from meeting, reports, letters, diaries, log books, accounts, budgets and other historical material produced in specific historical circumstances (for examples of the use of such sources, see Flyvbjerg 1991; Boje 1995; Jørgensen 2007). Finally these sources may be supplemented by other research methods, which record interaction as it occurs in the moment. Examples are tape recordings (e.g. Silverman and Jones 1976) or participant observation (e.g. Boje 1991).

In principle, genealogy seeks to focus on what occurs in the moment of becoming. This may sound paradoxical, since genealogy is a special kind of historical analysis. But it implies the suspensions of presumptions and prejudices about what happened, because these presumptions tend to result in totalizing BME-narratives constructed by the language of the present. Instead we need to approach the event on its own terms. Events thus have to be studied as different events in order to notice how stories develop, evolve and change. For that purpose, Foucault uses archaeological descriptions in the first phase of genealogy. 

Archaeology is characterized as a pure description of discursive events (Foucault 1995, p. 27). It is a method for organizing a description of such events, and the simple organizing principles are chronology, actors and space (Jørgensen 2007, p. 57). Foucault defines archaeology as a non-interpretative discipline and as a systematic rewriting of history (Foucault 1995, pp. 138-140). It is a disinterested (Flyvbjerg 1991, p. 98) and detailed rewriting of history, which is why genealogy is gray and patiently documentary. The purpose of this non-interpretative archaeological procedure is to open our eyes for a new and more complex and varied interpretation of history and to allow history to emerge “from below” so to speak. 

Genealogy is the tactics by which archaeological descriptions are brought into play (Foucault 1980, p. 85). Genealogy is thus constructed from archaeological descriptions and it brings in interests, intentions and relations of power as key interpretive concepts for mapping out the political situation in a particular society or organization (e.g. Elden 2001): “…it (power) is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation…” (Foucault 1993, p. 334). Genealogy is thus an interpretative strategy designed to intiate a critical stance towards the truth claims carried by language (Bauer 1999, p. 57). 

What organizations or actors within them perceive as good or true is thus perceived as negotiated among organizational  actors – actors with different interest and intentions. The complex result is a new political situation and new conditions for the construction of stories and narratives, and which means that some meanings and thereby futures are more probable and desirable and where other interpretations of time are doomed as insignificant, unimportant and unqualified. In this way power relations govern organizational strategies and thus the targets, distribution of resources, career paths, competencies etc., which all signify the values of the organization.

Conclusions
In summary we need to ground organization science in human action, interaction, imagination, in addition to intentions and interests. More specifically we need to show how these actions, interactions, imaginations, intentions and interests influence the storytelling performances in organizations and also how these storytelling performances influence the narratives of the present. Otherwise we do not get a proper understanding of narrative – we are bound to misunderstand them and explain them away as an act of god or some grand narrative. But instead of inventing an explanation, it is simply human will or more precisely the interactions, struggles and negotiations between many different wills that are the drivers of history. 

Storytelling is not an act of Nietzsche’s will to power (see for example Nietzsche 2003, pp. 136-139; Nietzsche 1992, pp. 54-55); rather storytelling and narratives are the results of relations of power in Foucault’s sense of the word. The difference is that where will to power is a basic psychological instinct in man, Foucault sees all interests and intentions as the result of “…strategies without strategists” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 109) with individuals viewed as the products of power (Foucault 1979, p. 194). That is, will itself is the product of history; the will is subjectively present but the direction of the will is socially moulded. 

Nietzsche’s original genealogy and Foucault’s application of it in conducting power analysis are thus slightly different. Nietzsche applies genealogy in order to show the contrast between the basic instinct in man – the will to power – which he saw as an indispensable part of human preservation and development: This includes naturally also whatever is called evil: “Hatred, the mischievous delight in the misfortunes of others, the lust to rob and dominate, and whatever else is called evil belongs to the most amazing economy of the preservation of species” (Nietzsche 1974, p. 73). Even if Foucault does not deny the presence of such elements in contemporary societies, he does not see them as a result of a basic instinct in man but rather would see lust to rob, lust to dominate, lust to exploit and so on as something that has been inculcated in the norm systems of our “enlightened capitalist society”.

Both share an interest in using genealogy as a means of self-overcoming - to become aware of self and attain a reflexive self and thus use genealogy as a first step towards emancipation (see Fairclough 2001, p. 1) by making selves conscious about how ways of thinking, acting and talking have been constructed through history: “…that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed” (Foucault in an interview with Rux Martin 1988, p. 11). Genealogical history is made for cutting (Foucault 1984, p. 88; Nietzsche 1997, p. 75-76), hence breaking with the past for the benefit of the time to come. 
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